This paper shows that subjective expected utility can be obtained using primitives that are much poorer than a preference relation on the set of acts. Our primitives only involve the fact that an act is judged either "attractive" or "unattractive". We give conditions implying that there are a utility function on the set of consequences and a probability distribution on the set of states such that attractive acts have a subjective expected utility above some threshold. The numerical representation that is obtained has strong uniqueness properties.
Introduction
In spite of the large amount of experimental evidence showing its limited ability to explain the behavior of many subjects, Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) remains the focal point of most works in decision under uncertainty. This is surely due to a rather unique combination of simplicity, analytical tractability and normative appeal.
Four main routes have been followed to obtain behavioral foundations for SEU (see Wakker, 1989a) . The first one works with a finite set of states and a finite set of consequences and uses separation techniques to ensure that the resulting equalities and inequalities will not be contradictory (see Shapiro, 1979) . As in the case of conjoint measurement (see Scott, 1964 or Krantz et al., 1971 , this technique leads to complex conditions that are not easy to test and interpret. The resulting numerical representation does not have strong uniqueness properties. The second route was opened by Savage (1954) . It makes no hypothesis on the set of consequences but requires a rich set of states. It leads to relatively simple conditions. The obtained numerical representation has strong uniqueness properties (for a recent advance along this line, see Abdellaoui and Wakker, 2005) . The third route is a kind of dual to the second one: it imposes richness on the set of consequences, while working with a finite set of states. Early contributions of this type include Gul (1992) , Nakamura (1990) and Wakker (1984 Wakker ( , 1989b . Recent advances along this line are surveyed and consolidated in Wakker (2003, 2004) and Wakker and Zank (1999) . As the second one, this route leads to simple conditions together with strong uniqueness properties. It uses conditions that are easily compared with the ones used in conjoint measurement (see Krantz et al., 1971 , Ch. 6 or Wakker, 1989a 3) since, in this framework, acts can be viewed as elements of a homogeneous Cartesian product (nevertheless, this approach can be extended to deal with more general set of states, see, e.g., Wakker, 1989a, Ch. 5) . A fourth route includes "lotteries" using "objective probabilities" in the analysis. It leads to relatively simpler results than the preceding two approaches. The price to pay for this simplicity is a richer framework that is often seen as less "pure" than frameworks refusing the introduction of objective probabilities. This approach was pioneered by Anscombe and Aumann (1963) . It leads to simple conditions together with strong uniqueness properties (a recent development along this line is Sarin and Wakker, 1997) . The last three approaches have also been used to analyze models extending SEU, such as Rank Dependent Utility (Gilboa, 1987 , Wakker, 1989a or Cumulative Prospect Theory Kahneman, 1992, Wakker and Tversky, 1993) . Recent reviews of the field of decision making under uncertainty are Gilboa (2009) and Wakker (2010) . This paper will only be concerned with SEU.
In the four approaches considered above, the primitives consist in a (well be-haved) preference relation on the set of acts. Given any two acts, the decision maker (DM) 1 is supposed to be in position to compare them in terms of strict preference or indifference. With the last three approaches, i.e., the ones leading to strong uniqueness results, the construction of the numerical representation involves building "standard sequences" (Krantz et al., 1971, Ch. 2) . This clearly implies working with several indifference curves (see, e.g., Wakker, 1989a, Fig. 3.5.2, p. 54) .
The central originality of this paper will be to work with much poorer primitives. For any act, we only expect the DM to be in position to tell us if she finds it "attractive" or "unattractive". We work with a finite set of states and a rich set of consequences as in the third route mentioned above. We give conditions implying that the set of attractive acts consists of all acts having a SEU that is above some threshold. The numerical representation will have strong uniqueness properties. This gives SEU alternative behavioral foundations that are based on parsimonious primitives and use conditions that are not much more complex than the ones used in conjunction with the classical primitives. Whereas the usual primitives for SEU lead to work with many (usually, infinitely many) indifference curves, our framework only allows to work with a single indifference curve that lies at the frontier between attractive and unattractive acts. Indeed, all attractive (or unattractive) acts are not supposed to be equally desirable.
This paper is not the first one in decision theory to work with ordered partitions instead of preference relations. The first move in this direction was made by Vind (1991) (see also Vind, 2003) in a rather abstract setting that has immediate application to conjoint measurement. This work was later developed in Marchant (2009, 2010) . While these papers were mainly concerned with additive representations, Goldstein (1991) studied decomposable numerical representations on the basis of such primitives. His work was later developed in Marchant (2007a,b) and S lowiński et al. (2002) . In the area of decision making under risk, Nakamura (2004) has analyzed various models using similar premisses. In particular, he gives Expected Utilityà la von Neumann-Morgenstern foundations that are similar to the ones sought here for SEU.
Since our primitives are non-standard, they deserve to be motivated. Our initial motivation was mainly of a theoretic nature: we wanted to know whether a complete preference relation on the set of all acts was really needed to derive SEU. We furthermore feel that the division of acts between the ones that are "attractive" and the ones that are not is fairly natural. Indeed, an attractive act may be interpreted as an act that the DM is willing to accept given her current situation, i.e., an attractive act is felt preferable to her "status quo". Bleichrodt (2007 Bleichrodt ( , 2008 has forcefully argued that, when the status quo is available in all choice sets presented to the DM, it is unreasonable to suppose that it is possible to derive a preference between acts that are judged less desirable than the status quo since such acts are never chosen 2 . In contrast, Bleichrodt (2007 Bleichrodt ( , 2008 supposes that a preference relation can be derived for "attractive" acts. Bleichrodt (2008, Th. 1) studies a model in which the preference relation between attractive acts can be explained by SEU. Our paper may be viewed as an extension of Bleichrodt (2008) in which "attractive" acts are not compared in terms of preference. This situation may seem uncommon. Let us simply observe that, besides being parsimonious in terms of information, it corresponds to the observation of the behavior of a DM that judges all "attractive" acts "choosable", e.g., because she has no constraints and can afford to have them all or because this is the result of first-cut analysis than only aims at discarding "unattractive" acts.
In the model proposed in Bleichrodt (2008) the status quo is seen as "reference point", in line with models for decision making under uncertainty that deviates from SEU such as Prospect Theory Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992 ) and other models (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2007, Sugden, 2003) . Therefore, he also studies what happens when the reference point changes (Bleichrodt, 2008, Th. 2) . In this paper, we are much closer to a strict Bayesian framework. SEU will be used to distinguish between acts "above" and "below" the status quo which is viewed as the current endowment of the DM and is not supposed to vary. In our model, "tastes" and/or "beliefs" are identical above and below the status quo.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our setting and notation. Section 3 presents the conditions used in this paper. Our characterization of SEU is presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Most proofs are relegated in Appendix.
2 The setting
Notation
We adopt a classical setting for decision under uncertainty with a finite number of states and we mainly follow the terminology and notation used in Wakker (1989a) . Let Γ = {α, β, γ, . . .} be a set of consequences. The set of states is N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. It is understood that the elements of N are exhaustive and mutually exclusive: one and only one state will turn out to be true. An act is a function from N to Γ. The set of all acts is denoted by X = {a, b, c, . . .} = Γ N . It will prove convenient to identify the set of acts with the homogeneous Cartesian product n i=1 Γ i , where, for all i ∈ N , Γ i = Γ. Hence, the act a ∈ X will often be written as (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ).
Let E ⊆ N and a, b ∈ X . We denote by (a E , b −E ) the act c ∈ X such that c i = a i , for all i ∈ E, and c i = b i , for all i ∈ N \ E. We will also write that a E ∈ Γ E and b −E ∈ Γ −E , abusing notation. Similarly (α E , b −E ) will denote the act d ∈ X such that d i = α ∈ Γ, for all i ∈ E, and d i = b i , for all i ∈ N \ E. When sets contain few elements, we often omit braces around them and write, e.g., (a i , b −i ), (α ij , b −ij ) or (α i , a j , b −ij ). This should cause no confusion.
Primitives
The traditional primitives in decision making under uncertainty consist in a binary relation 3 on X . We use here a twofold ordered partition of X . We suppose that acts in X are presented to a DM. For each of these acts, she will specify whether she finds it "attractive" or "unattractive". This process defines a twofold ordered partition A , U of the set X (note that we abuse terminology here since, at this stage, we do not require each of A and U to be nonempty). Acts in A are judged Attractive. Acts in U are judged Unattractive. As already noted, a suggestive, but by no means compulsory, interpretation of our setting is that attractive acts are the acts that are judged strictly better than the status quo.
The two categories in A , U are ordered. All acts in A are preferable to all acts in U . It is important to notice that acts belonging to A are not "equally" desirable. Some of them may be quite attractive while others may only be slightly better than the status quo. A similar remark holds for U .
We say that a state i ∈ N is influent for A , U if there are α, β ∈ Γ and a ∈ X such that (α i , a −i ) ∈ A and (β i , a −i ) ∈ U . A state that is not influent has no impact on the ordered partition A , U and, thus, may be suppressed from N . Hence, we will suppose that all states are influent. As explained in Bouyssou and Marchant (2009) , the analysis of the case of two states requires techniques that are quite different and much simpler than the ones used here (this case does not lead to strong uniqueness results). This explains that the following assumption is maintained throughout this paper.
Assumption 1
There are at least three states. All states are influent.
Observe that Assumption 1 implies that both A and U are nonempty.
3 In what follows, whenever the symbol is used to denote a binary relation, it will be understood that denotes its asymmetric part and ∼ its symmetric part. Similar conventions hold when is subscripted or superscripted. A complete and transitive binary relation will be called a weak order.
Model
We analyze a model in which all attractive acts have a subjective expected utility above some threshold. This model involves a real-valued function u on Γ and nonnegative real numbers p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n that add up to one. The function u is interpreted as a utility function and the number p i as the subjective probability of state i ∈ N . Hence n i=1 p i u(a i ) is interpreted as the subjective expected utility of act a ∈ X . Our model is such that, for all a ∈ X ,
It is clear that it is not restrictive to suppose that the threshold separating attractive and unattractive acts is set to 0. When the set Γ is endowed with a topology, we might additionally require that the function u is continuous w.r.t. this topology. We will do so below.
Under Assumption 1, all states are influent. It is easy to see that this implies that, for all i ∈ N , p i > 0 and that u is nonconstant.
Axioms

Tradeoff consistency
Our main non-technical condition is presented first. It is inspired by the "tradeoff consistency" conditions used in Wakker (1989a) and we have kept this name.
A1 Tradeoff consistency
Condition A1 (Tradeoff consistency) is necessary for model (1). Indeed, suppose it is violated. We easily obtain:
Since p i , p j > 0, the first two equations imply that u(α) − u(β) > u(δ) − u(γ) while the last two imply u(δ) − u(γ) > u(α) − u(β), a contradiction. The interpretation of the above condition is simple: tradeoffs between consequences should be independent from the state in which they are revealed.
Let us now introduce a condition that is a variant of a condition used in Vind (1991) that has been modified to cope with the case of a homogeneous Cartesian product.
B1 1-Linearity For all i, j ∈ N , all α, β ∈ Γ and all a, b ∈ X ,
Condition B1 is necessary for model (1) since its violation would lead to
The intuitive idea behind this condition is that consequences can be ordered. We define the binary relation A on Γ letting, for all α, β ∈ Γ,
It is simple to check that A is always reflexive and transitive. Hence, it will be a weak order as soon as it is complete. The following lemma shows that A is complete iff A , U satisfies B1 (1-Linearity).
Lemma 1 The relation
A is complete iff A , U satisfies B1 (1-Linearity).
Sufficiency. Suppose that Not[α A β]. This implies that, for some i ∈ N and some a ∈ X , (
It will be useful to note the following.
Lemma 2
If a twofold partition satisfies A1 (Tradeoff consistency) then it satisfies B1 (1-Linearity).
which is clearly equivalent to B1 (1-Linearity). 2
It will be also useful to note that A1 (Tradeoff consistency) also implies the following condition.
Lemma 3
If a twofold partition satisfies A1 (Tradeoff consistency) then it satisfies B2 (2-Linearity).
which is clearly equivalent to B2 (2-Linearity). 2
Other conditions
Under A1 (Tradeoff consistency) and, hence, B1 (1-Linearity), we have a weak order A on Γ. The set Γ is endowed with the order topology generated by
A . The set X , viewed as Γ n is then endowed with the product topology. This will allow us to introduce our main structural assumption, the definition of which presupposes that A is a weak order. It is clearly not necessary for model (1).
A2
Connectedness When A is a weak order, the set Γ is connected in the order topology generated by A .
Our next condition will be necessary if the function u on Γ is required to be continuous w.r.t. the topology on Γ introduced above.
A3 Openness
The set A is open in the product topology on X .
Our final condition says that, given any act a ∈ X and any state i ∈ N , it is always possible to modify the consequence of act a on state i so as to reach A and U . This will imply that in our model the function u is unbounded. This condition is quite strong and, as in Bleichrodt (2008), we only introduce it to keep things simple.
A4 Unboundedness
For all i ∈ N and all a ∈ X , we have (α i , a −i ) ∈ A and (β i , a −i ) ∈ U , for some α, β ∈ Γ.
Result and comments
Result
Our characterization of SEU is as follows.
Theorem 1
Consider a twofold ordered partition A , U of X such that Assumption 1 holds. Suppose that A , U satisfies A1 (Tradeoff consistency), A2 (Connectedness), A3 (Openness), and A4 (Unboundedness). Then there are a continuous real-valued function u on Γ with range R and n strictly positive numbers p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n adding up to 1 such that (1) holds.
The numbers p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n are unique. The function u is unique up to a multiplication by a strictly positive constant.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix. It uses techniques from Bleichrodt (2007 Bleichrodt ( , 2008 Marchant (2009, 2010) , and Gilboa et al. (2002) .
Relation to classical results
Theorem 1 shows that SEU can be obtained on the basis of premisses that are much poorer than the classical ones. Indeed, given any weak order on X and given any act a ∈ X , we can build an ordered partition letting A a = {b ∈ X : b a} and U a = {b ∈ X : a b}. Classical results on SEU therefore, implicitly, manipulate several twofold ordered partitions. We only use one. Yet, we obtain an SEU representation with strong uniqueness properties.
The reader may therefore think that this is due to the fact that the conditions used in Theorem 1 are quite strong. In order to show that this is not the case, let us briefly recall a classic result on SEU.
Let be a binary relation on X . This relation is said to satisfy CCI (Cardinal Coordinate Independence) (this condition was originally introduced in Wakker, 1984 . This condition is often called "tradeoff consistency" in Wakker's later texts, e.g., Wakker, 1988b Wakker, , 1989a if:
for all i, j ∈ N , all a, b, c, d ∈ X and all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ. It is well known that, when is complete and satisfies CCI, if any of the premises of CCI holds with instead of , the conclusion of CCI must hold with . Similarly, when the relation is complete and satisfies CCI, it also satisfies CI (Coordinate Independence), i.e., for all i ∈ N , all α, β ∈ Γ and all a, b ∈ X ,
We have:
Theorem 2 (Wakker, 1989a, Th. IV.2.7, page 83) Suppose that Γ is a connected topological space and endow X with the product topology. Suppose furthermore that n ≥ 2 and that all states are essential, i.e., for all i ∈ N , there are α, β ∈ Γ and a ∈ X such that
If is a weak order on X that satisfies CCI and is continuous (i.e., the sets {a ∈ X : a b} and {a ∈ X : b a} are open for all b ∈ X ), there are a continuous real valued function v on Γ and n strictly positive numbers q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n adding up to 1 such that, for all a, b ∈ X ,
Furthermore, the function u is unique up to scale and location and the numbers q i are unique.
In the above statement, we have omitted the hypothesis that the topology on Γ is separable, since this is only needed when only one state is influent (see Wakker, 1989a , Remark A.3.1, page 163 or Wakker, 1988a .
Suppose now that n ≥ 3 and that we have a binary relation on X satisfying the conditions of Theorem 2. Let r ∈ X . Let us show that the twofold ordered partition A r = {b ∈ X : b r} and U r = {b ∈ X : r b} will satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1.
Let i ∈ N and define the binary relation i on Γ letting, for all α, β ∈ Γ,
. Let us also denote by α the constant act giving the outcome α ∈ Γ in all states i ∈ N . Define the relation Γ on Γ letting for all α, β ∈ Γ, α Γ β ⇔ α β. Since is a weak order satisfying CCI, it is easy to check that i = j = Γ , for all i, j ∈ N , and that Γ is a weak order. As observed in Wakker (1989a, p. 50) , the topology on Γ can always be taken to be the order topology generated by Γ .
By definition, α A β implies that (α i , a −i ) ∈ A and (β i , a −i ) / ∈ A , for some a, b ∈ X and some i ∈ N . Hence, we have (α i , a −i ) r and r (β i , a −i ), so that (α i , a −i ) (β i , a −i ). This shows that α A β implies α Γ β. Hence, the order topology generated by A is coarser than the order topology generated by Γ . This shows that A2 (Connectedness) and A3 (Openness) will hold.
Let us show that A1 (Tradeoff consistency) holds. Suppose, in contradiction with the thesis that we have
Using the fact that is a weak order, this leads to
Hence, A1 (Tradeoff consistency) holds. Finally, observe that, if the function v in Theorem 2 is unbounded, condition A4 (Unboundedness) will hold.
Hence, when there are at least three states, our hypotheses does not seem to be stronger than what is usually supposed in classical derivations of SEU.
Consider now a binary relation satisfying all conditions of Theorem 2. This implies that there are a continuous real valued function v on Γ and n strictly positive numbers q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n such that (2) holds. We have just shown that if v has range R, taking any r ∈ X , the ordered partition A r = {a ∈ X : a r} and U r = {a ∈ X : r a} will satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1. Hence, there are a continuous real-valued function u on Γ with range R and n strictly positive numbers p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n adding up to 1 such that (1) holds. In view of the uniqueness result in Theorems 1 and 2, it is clear that q i = p i , for all i ∈ N and that v = u, so that the SEU representation built using is identical to the SEU representation built using the ordered partition A r , U r .
Relation to classical experiments
Our central condition is A1 (Tradeoff consistency). Although we have not tested it in experiments, we have good reasons to believe that adapting classical experiments to our setting will easily lead to falsify it.
Ellsberg's problem
Consider first the classical problem presented in Ellsberg (1961) and depicted in Table 1 . An urn contains 90 balls that are Red (R), Black (B) or Yellow (Y). It is known that 30 of these balls are Red. The other 60 are either Black or Yellow in unknown proportions. Confronted with the acts x, y, z, and w in Table 1 , the modal preferences of subjects in experiments are x y and w z. These preferences are easily explained by the desire to bet on an "unambiguous event" (R, when comparing x and y, and [B or Y] , when comparing z and w). They are incompatible with model (2) (these modal preferences violate CI). In this example, it seems natural to suppose that all acts will be judged acceptable since R B Y
x 100 0 0 y 0 100 0 z 100 0 100 w 0 100 100 Table 2 and let us imagine how the subjects having the modal preference in Ellsberg's problem might react to them. Since x y in the original problem and there are only 10 White balls, it is likely R W B Y
x 100 − 0 0 y 0 − 100 0 z τ 100 −τ 0 100 w τ 0 −τ 100 100 that these subjects will consider that x y . When is small, it is likely that both x and y will be considered acceptable. When increases, the desirability of both acts decreases. We may eventually find a value of such that, for many of these subjects, x ∈ A and y ∈ U . Using a similar reasoning, it is likely that there will be a value of τ such that, for many of these subjects, z τ ∈ U and w τ ∈ A . Summarizing, it is likely that there will be subjects stating that:
which violates B2 (2-Linearity) with i = R and j = B. Hence, A1 (Tradeoff consistency) is violated.
Allais' problem
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) have shown how the classical problem in Allais (1953) can be adapted to cover decisions under uncertainty. Their example involves a bet of the absolute value d of the difference between the closing values of the Dow-Jones between two consecutive days. Given the acts presented in Table 3 , the modal preferences of subjects are x y and w z, which is incompatible with model (2) (these modal preferences violate CI). Yet, these preferences are easily explained by the attraction of a sure win (comparing x with y) combined with the desire to go for the larger gain when uncertain (comparing w with z).
d Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 303) .
Again, all these acts are likely to be judged acceptable since they do not involve losses. Consider now the modified problem presented in Table 4 . Using the same reasoning as with Ellsberg's problem, it is likely that there are and τ such that many subjects will state that x ∈ A , y ∈ U , z τ ∈ U and w τ ∈ A . It is simple to check that this violates B2 (2-Linearity) and, hence, A1 (Tradeoff consistency).
Discussion
This paper has analyzed decision making under uncertainty replacing the traditional primitives consisting in a preference relation on the set of acts by a twofold ordered partition of this set. A possible interpretation of this setting is that each act is positioned vis-à-vis a status quo and is either "acceptable" or "unacceptable". Within a framework using a finite set of states and a rich set of consequences, we have given conditions on a twofold ordered partition ensuring that it can be represented in such a way that all attractive acts have a subjective expected utility above some threshold. The obtained representation has strong uniqueness properties. This gives SEU alternative behavioral foundations based on primitives that are much poorer than the ones traditionally considered in the literature and using conditions that are reasonably simple. We have shown that our conditions do not seem to be stronger than the classical ones used to characterize SEU. We have also shown that it is likely that simple adaptations of Ellsberg's and Allais's problems will lead to falsify our central condition (Tradeoff consistency). The line of research consisting in replacing a preference relation by an ordered partition to analyze classical models is still quite open. Let us simply mention here three directions for future research. First, it is important to present a result similar to Theorem 1 without the use of A4 (Unboundedness). Given Bouyssou and Marchant (2009, Cor. 1), this should not raise major problems. Second, an important question is to study models extending SEU, such as Rank Dependent Utility (Gilboa, 1987 , Wakker, 1989a or Cumulative Prospect Theory Kahneman, 1992, Wakker and Tversky, 1993) , using primitives such as the ones used here. The third question is empirical. On the basis of the numerous empirical studies on the validity of SEU, we have suggested experiments that are likely to lead to a falsification of our model. We have not performed any empirical analysis however. It might be the case that questions phrased in terms of our primitives generate different behavior than questions phrased in terms of classical primitives (for an example of the influence of the questioning mode on behavior, see Tversky et al., 1988) .
Appendix: Proofs
We suppose throughout this appendix that all conditions in Theorem 1 hold. Define, for each i ∈ N , the binary relation A i on Γ letting, for all α, β ∈ Γ, Let A = Cl(A ), F = A \ A , and
It is clear that all relations
U • = U \ F. For all i ∈ N and all a ∈ X , define U (a −i ) = {β ∈ Γ : (β i , a −i ) ∈ U }, A (a −i ) = {α ∈ Γ : (α i , a −i ) ∈ A }, A (a −i ) = {α ∈ Γ : (α i , a −i ) ∈ A }, U • (a −i ) = {α ∈ Γ : (α i , a −i ) ∈ U • }, and F(a −i ) = {α ∈ Γ : (α i , a −i ) ∈ F}. By construction, we have that U (a −i ) ∩ A (a −i ) = ∅ and U (a −i ) ∪ A (a −i ) = Γ.
A Preliminary lemmas Lemma 4
For all i ∈ N , the relation A i has no maximal or minimal elements. The relation A has no maximal or minimal elements.
Proof
Let α ∈ Γ, a ∈ X and i, j ∈ N with i = j. Using A4 (Unboundedness), we have (α i , γ j , a −ij ) ∈ U , for some γ ∈ Γ. Using A4 (Unboundedness), we have (β i , γ j , a −ij ) ∈ A , for some β ∈ Γ. This shows that α ∈ Γ cannot be maximal for A has no maximal or minimal elements now follows from the fact that
For all a ∈ X and all i ∈ N , we have U (a −i ) = ∅ and A (a −i ) = ∅. The set
The first part results from A4 (Unboundedness). The second part follows from A3 (Openness) (see Wakker, 1989a , Lemma 0.2.1, p. 12). The final part follows from the fact that U (a −i ) = Γ \ A (a −i ). 2
Lemma 6
Let i ∈ N , and a ∈ X . We have (γ i , a −i ) ∈ F, for some γ ∈ Γ.
Proof
We know from Lemma 5 that U (a −i ) = ∅ is closed and that A (a −i ) = ∅ is open. Since A is closed, we know (see Wakker, 1989a , Lemma 0.2.1, p. 12) that the set A (a −i ) is closed. It is nonempty because A (a −i ) is nonempty. If A (a −i ) ∩ U (a −i ) = ∅, we have separated Γ into two closed nonempty sets, violating A2 (Connectedness). Hence we must have
Lemma 7
Let i ∈ N , and a ∈ X . We have U (a −i ) = {β ∈ Γ : ι(a −i ) A β} and A (a −i ) = {β ∈ Γ : β A ι(a −i )}, for some ι(a −i ) ∈ Γ.
Proof
We know from Lemma 5 that the set U (a −i ) = {β ∈ Γ : (β i , a −i ) ∈ U } is nonempty and closed. Let β ∈ U (a −i ). Since
We have shown that β ∈ U (a −i ) and β A γ imply γ ∈ U (a −i ). This implies that the nonempty set U (a −i ) is unbounded below. Since it is closed, there is ι(a −i ) ∈ Γ such that, U (a −i ) = {β ∈ Γ : ι(a −i )
A β}. This implies that A (a −i ) = {β ∈ Γ :
Lemma 8 Let i ∈ N , α, β ∈ Γ, and a ∈ X . If (α i , a −i ) ∈ F and (β i , a −i ) ∈ F then α ∼ A β.
In view of Lemma 7, we have A (a −i ) = {δ ∈ Γ :
Lemma 9
Let i ∈ N , α, β ∈ Γ, and a ∈ X . If
Lemma 10
For all i, j ∈ N , all a, b ∈ X and all α, β ∈ Γ,
The first part follows from the definition of
A . If (α j , b −j ) ∈ F, Lemma 9 implies (β j , b −j ) ∈ F. This proves the second part. The last part follows.
2
Lemma 11
For all i ∈ N , all α, β ∈ Γ and all a ∈ X ,
Proof
The first part follows from the definition of A . For the second part, observe, using Lemma 7 that, (
The third part follows from Lemma 9. To prove the fourth part, suppose that (α i , a −i ) ∈ F and α A β. In view of the first two parts, it is impossible that (β i , a −i ) ∈ A . Hence, we must have (β i , a −i ) ∈ U
• . The last part follows from the fact that, if
B Additive representation of A , U
Our aim is to show that there is an additive representation of A , U , i.e., that there are n real-valued functions v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , . . . , v n on Γ such that for all a, b ∈ X ,
This additive representation is said to be continuous if all functions v i are continuous. Let j ∈ N . Define the binary relations (j) and
B.1 Preliminary lemmas Lemma 12
The relation A −j is a weak order.
Proof
This is an immediate consequence of B1 (1-Linearity). 2
Lemma 13
We have
Proof
Suppose that x −j (j) y −j so that we have (α j , x −j ) ∈ A and (α j , y −j ) ∈ U , for some α ∈ Γ. In contradiction with the thesis, suppose that Not[x −j A −j y −j ]. This implies that, for some β ∈ Γ, we have (β j , y −j ) ∈ A and (β j , x −j ) ∈ U . If α A β, (β j , y −j ) ∈ A implies (α j , y −j ) ∈ A , a contradiction. Hence, we must have β A α. Using Lemma 11, β A α and (
Lemma 14
For all a, b ∈ X ,
Proof The [⇐] part follows from the definition of (j) . Let us prove the [⇒] part.
Suppose that a −j ∼ (j) b −j , so that, for some α, β ∈ Γ,
Using Lemma 6, we know that there is a δ ∈ Γ such that (δ j , a −j ) ∈ F. If (δ j , b −j ) ∈ F, there is nothing to prove.
Lemma 15
Proof Suppose that (α j , a −j ) ∈ A and (α j , b −j ) ∈ F, for some α ∈ Γ. This implies
and Lemma 14 implies that (β j , a −j ) ∈ F and (β j , b −j ) ∈ F, for some β ∈ Γ. Because (α j , a −j ) ∈ A , we must have that α A β.
Suppose now that a −j (j) b −j . We know that there is α ∈ Γ such that (α j , b −j ) ∈ F. If (α j , a −j ) ∈ U , we obtain b −j (j) a −j , a contradiction. Hence, we must have (α j , a −j ) ∈ A , as required. This completes the proof of the first equivalence.
Suppose that (δ j , a −j ) ∈ F and (δ j , b −j ) ∈ U • , for some δ ∈ Γ. This implies
Suppose now that a −j (j) b −j . We know that there is δ ∈ Γ such that (δ j , a −j ) ∈ F. If (δ j , b −j ) ∈ A , we obtain b −j (j) a −j , a contradiction. Hence, we must have (δ j , b −j ) ∈ U
• , as required. 2
Lemma 16
The relation (j) satisfies CCI, i.e.,
and, in contradiction with the thesis, that (β k , d −kj ) (j) (α k , c −kj ). Using Lemma 15 and the definition of (j) , we know that we have
for some τ, λ, ζ, ρ ∈ Γ. From (4d), using A2 (Connectedness), we can find ρ ∈ Γ such that ρ A ρ and (ρ j , β k , d −kj ) ∈ A . From (4h), using Lemma 11, we obtain. (ρ j , α k , c −kj ) ∈ U
• . Let = j, k. Using the fact that A is unbounded and A2 (Connectedness), we can find χ, ψ ∈ Γ such that d A ψ, χ A c , and
Using (4c) and (4g), we have (
Using the fact that
A is unbounded and A2 (Connectedness), we can find δ , γ ∈ Γ such that γ A γ and δ A δ and
Using (4b) and (4f), we obtain (
. Using the fact that
A is unbounded and A2 (Connectedness), we can find ν, ω ∈ Γ such that b m A ω, ν A a m , and
Using (4a) and (4e), we obtain
Summarizing, after rearranging the terms, we have:
which violates A1 (Tradeoff consistency). 2
Lemma 17
All states i ∈ N \ {j} are essential for the relation (j) .
Proof
Let i ∈ N \ {j}. We have to show that there are a ∈ X and α, β ∈ Γ such that (α i , a −ij ) (j) (β i , a −ij ). Let a ∈ X and α ∈ Γ. Using Lemma 6, we can find ξ ∈ Γ such that (ξ j , α i , a −ij ) ∈ F. Using Lemma 4, there is β ∈ Γ such that α A β. Using Lemma 11, we obtain (ξ j , β i , a −ij ) ∈ U
• . Using Lemma 15, this implies that
Let i = j. We define the relation
Because (j) is a weak order satisfying CCI, it satisfies CI. Hence, we have:
Lemma 18
For all i = j, we have
Proof Suppose that β A α and α (j) i β. We know that (δ j , α i , a −ij ) ∈ F, for some δ ∈ Γ. Using β A α, we obtain (δ j , β i , a −ij ) ∈ A . Using Lemma 15, this implies
, for some a ∈ X , and α A β. Using Lemma 15, we have (δ j , β i , a −ij ) ∈ A and (δ j , α i , a −ij ) ∈ F, for some δ ∈ Γ. Using α A β and (δ j , β i , a −ij ) ∈ A , we obtain (δ j , α i , a −ij ) ∈ A , a contradiction.
Lemma 19
The relation (j) is continuous, i.e., for all i ∈ N \ {j} and all a ∈ X the sets
} is open, the other case being similar.
Using Lemma 15, we have Using (α j , β k , b −jk ) ∈ A as a starting point, we can now use the same reasoning on any state = j, k. It is easy to see that this will lead to find c ∈ X such that (α j , c −j ) ∈ A and, for all i = j, b i A c i . This implies that each
B.2 Additive representation of
We start by showing that the relation (j) has an additive representation. We only show this for j = 1.
Lemma 20
There are n − 1 continuous functions v 2 , v 3 , . . . , v n such that for all a, b ∈ X ,
If two sets of functions v i i =1 and u i i =1 satisfy (6) then there are there are real numbers A, B 2 , B 3 , . . . , B n such that A > 0 and, for all i ∈ N \ {1}, v i = Au i + B i .
Proof
The plan is to use Wakker (1989a, Th. III.6.6, p. 70) on (1) with the following modifications. The hypothesis of topological separability can be omitted when at least two attributes are essential (see Wakker, 1989a , Remark A.3.1, page 163 or Wakker, 1988a ). The topology on Γ i can be taken to be the order topology generated the induced marginal relations on attribute i (Wakker, 1989a, Step 1.2, p. 50) .
We know from Lemma 13 that (1) is a weak order. Using Lemma 17, we know all states are essential and n − 1 ≥ 2. Lemma 16 has shown that (1) satisfies CCI, which implies generalized triple cancellation in the sense of Wakker (1989a, Th. III.6.6, p. 70) . Because of Lemma 18 and A2 (Connectedness), we know that each Γ i is connected in the order topology generated by
A . Using Lemma 19, we know that
(1) is continuous. Hence, applying Wakker (1989a, Th. III.6.6, p. 70) together with Wakker (1989a, Observation III.6.6 , p. 71) 
Suppose that v i i =1 is a continuous additive representation of (1) . Let a ∈ X . Using Lemma 6, we can find α ∈ Γ such that (α 1 , a −1 ) ∈ F. Conversely, given any α ∈ Γ, we have (α 1 , a −1 ) ∈ F, for some a ∈ X . Now, define v 1 letting, for all α ∈ Γ,
It is easy to see that v 1 is well-defined. Indeed if (α 1 , a −1 ) ∈ F and (α 1 , b −1 ) ∈ F, we know from Lemma 14 that a −1 ∼ (1) b −1 , so that:
Let us now show that such a function v 1 together with the functions v i i =1 give an additive representation for A , U .
If (a 1 , a −1 ) ∈ F, then, by construction, we have v 1 (a 1 ) + i =1 v i (a i ) = 0. Suppose that (a 1 , a −1 ) ∈ A . Using Lemma 6 on any state k other than 1, we know that (a 1 , α k , a −1k ) ∈ F, for some α ∈ Γ. Hence, we have:
Using Lemma 15, (a 1 , a −1 ) ∈ A and (a 1 , α k , a −1k ) ∈ F imply a −1 (j) (α k , a −1k ), so that:
Hence we have built an additive representation of A , U . Observe that in this representation, we know that v 2 , v 3 , . . . , v n are continuous functions. 2
Lemma 22
If there is an additive representation of A , U then, for all i ∈ N ,
Lemma 23
In the additive representation of A , U built in Lemma 21 the range of each v i is R.
Proof
We first show that this is the case for all i = 1. Take α, β ∈ Γ such that α A β. Using Lemma 22, we know that
, which will complete the proof since we know that v i is continuous.
Take j = i, 1. We can find λ ∈ Γ such that (α i , λ j , a −ij ) ∈ F, for some a ∈ X . We can find µ ∈ Γ and b ∈ X such that (β i , µ j , a −ij ) ∈ F and (
. The other part of the proof is similar.
Consider now the case of v 1 . For all a ∈ X , we know that there is α ∈ Γ such that (α 1 , a −1 ) ∈ F. This implies v 1 (α) = − n i=2 v i (a i ). Hence, v 1 has the same range as − n i=2 v i , i.e., R.
Lemma 24
In the additive representation of A , U built in Lemma 21 each function v i is continuous.
Proof
We only have to show that v 1 is continuous. Let us show that v 1 on the set Γ/∼ A is continuous. If α A β, we know that v 1 (α) > v 1 (β). Hence the function v 1 goes from Γ/∼ A endowed with the order topology generated by A to R endowed with the standard topology. This function is order preserving. It is bijective since the range of v 1 is R. Hence, it is a homeomorphism (Munkres, 1975, p. 111) . The proof is complete since we can extend v 1 to Γ making it constant on each equivalence class of ∼ A , in view of the construction of v 1 in Lemma 21 and Lemma 11. 2
Lemma 25
If there is a continuous additive representation of A , U , i.e., (3) holds, then, for all a ∈ X ,
Proof Suppose that a ∈ F. Because a ∈ F implies a ∈ U , we know that
Because v j is continuous and has range R, there is α ∈ Γ such that
Let k = j. Because v k is continuous and has range R, there is β ∈ Γ such that
Conversely, suppose that
• is open, we can find α ∈ Γ such that α A a j , and (α j , a −j ) ∈ U • . Using Lemma 22, we have
Lemma 26
If there is a continuous additive representation of A , U , i.e., (3) holds, then each function v i represents A .
Proof
In view of Lemma 22, we only have to prove that α ∼ A β implies v i (α) = v i (β) Using Lemma 14, α ∼ A β implies that for some a ∈ X , (α i , a −i ) ∈ F and (β i , a −i ) ∈ F. Using Lemma 25, this implies that
Lemma 27
There are n continuous functions v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , . . . , v n such that for all a, b ∈ X ,
The range of each function v i is R. If v i i∈N and u i i∈N are two sets of functions giving an additive representation of A , U then there are real numbers A, B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n such that A > 0 and Let v i i∈N be any additive representation of A , U . Let us show that v i i =1 must be an additive representation of (1) . Suppose that a −1 ∼ (1) b −1 . Using Lemmas 14 and 25, we must have
Similarly, using Lemmas 15 and 25, a −1
(
additive representation of A , U must also be an additive representation of (1) .
Conversely, Lemma 21 has shown that given any additive representation for (1) , we can obtain an additive representation for A , U that uses the same functions for i = 1. Because (1) satisfies all conditions of Wakker (1989a, Th. III.6.6, p. 70) , we know that we know that any two additive representations of (1) , u i i =1 and v i i =1 , must be such that v i (a i ) = Au i (a i ) + B i , with A > 0.
Let a ∈ X . Using Lemma 6 on any state k distinct from 1, we have (a 1 , b −1 ) ∈ F, for some b ∈ X . This implies that if u i i∈N and v i i∈N are two representations of A , U , for all a ∈ X , we have
where b ∈ X is such that (a 1 , b −1 ) ∈ F. Therefore, we obtain v 1 = Au 1 − i =1 B i . Hence, the two sets of functions will be such that, for all i ∈ N , v i = Au i + B i with A > 0 and n i=1 B i = 0. 2 C SEU representation of A , U
We now show that the continuous additive representation of A , U can be modified in such a way as to give a continuous SEU representation of A , U .
Lemma 28
Consider the continuous additive representation of A , U built in Lemma 27. Take any two states i, j ∈ N with i = j. The function v i is a positive affine transformation of the function v j , i.e., there are A, B ∈ R with A > 0 such that v i = Av j + B.
Proof
Let us show that, for all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ, we have
Because both v i and v j are continuous and have range R, this implies that v i is an affine transformation of v j . Because both functions represent the nontrivial relation A , this affine transformation must be strictly positive. Suppose now that v j (α) − v j (β) = v j (γ) − v j (δ). Take any k = i, j. We can find λ, µ ∈ Γ and a, b ∈ X such that:
(α j , λ k , a −jk ) ∈ F, (β j , µ k , a −jk ) ∈ F, (γ j , λ k , b −jk ) ∈ F.
Because v j (α) − v j (β) = v j (γ) − v j (δ), we must have (δ j , µ k , b −jk ) ∈ F.
We can find λ , µ ∈ Γ and c, d ∈ X such that
Because (α j , λ k , a −jk ) ∈ F and (γ j , λ k , b −jk ) ∈ F, Lemma 14 implies (α j , a −jk ) ∼ 
(α i , c −ik ). Using Lemma 16, we know that (k) satisfies CCI. Hence, we obtain
Similarly, we have (β j , a −jk ) (k) (δ j , b −jk ), (γ j , b −jk ) (k) (α j , a −jk ), (α i , c −ik )
(γ i , d −ik ). Using CCI, we obtain (β i , c −ik ) (k) (δ i , d −ik ). Hence, we have (β i , c −ik ) ∼ (k) (δ i , d −ik ). Since we know that (β i , µ k , c −ik ) ∈ F, using Lemma 11, we obtain (δ i , µ k , d −ik ) ∈ F. Hence, we have
Proof of Theorem 1 Existence. Using Lemma 27, we know that there is a continuous additive representation of A , U . The function V = n i=1 v i on Γ is continuous and has range R. Hence, there is α ∈ Γ such that α ∈ F. Using the B i in the uniqueness results of the functions v i , we can always ensure that, for all i ∈ N , v i (α) = 0. Take any β A α. Take any j ∈ N . Using the A in the uniqueness result of the functions v i , we can always ensure that, v j (β) = 1. For all i ∈ N , let v i (β) = λ i > 0.
Define u = v j and, for all i ∈ N let p i = λ i / n k=1 λ k . With such definitions, all terms p i u are proportional to the v i , so that for all a ∈ X ,
Because the range of v j is R, the range of u is R. The continuity of u follows from the continuity of v j . This completes the proof of the existence part.
Uniqueness. It is clear that multiplying u by a positive constant leads to another continuous SEU representation of A , U . The only arbitrary choices made above were the choice of a particular j to set u = v j and the choice of a particular β ∈ Γ with β A α to set v j (β) = 1. Indeed, the existence of a continuous SEU representation implies that there is an element α ∈ Γ such that α ∈ F. For this element, it is necessary to have u(α) = 0. Since we have to rescale the functions v i in such a way that for all i ∈ N , v i (α) = 0, all functions v i become identical up to the multiplication by a positive constant. Now choosing k ∈ N with k = j to set u = v k and γ ∈ Γ different from β and such that γ A α to set v k (γ) = 1, will only result in the multiplication of u by a positive constant. Finally, observe that the choice of the p i is the only possible one to ensure that n i=1 p i = 1 and that, for all i ∈ N , p i u is proportional to v i . It is clear that multiplying each v i by a positive constant leaves all p i unchanged.
